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ABSTRACT
This article revisits the claim that mass incarceration constitutes a new
form of racial segregation, or Jim Crow. Drawing from historical sources,
it demonstrates that proponents of the analogy miss an important
commonality between the two phenomena, namely the debt that each owe
to progressive and/or liberal politics. Though generally associated with
repression and discrimination, both Jim Crow and mass incarceration owe
their existence in part to enlightened reforms aimed at promoting black
interests, albeit with perverse results. Recognizing the aspirational origins
of systematic discrimination marks an important facet of comprehending
the persistence of racial inequality in the United States.
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THE NEW JIM CROW?
RECOVERING THE PROGRESSIVE ORIGINS OF
MASS INCARCERATION
ANDERS WALKER

INTRODUCTION
Few issues of racial injustice eclipse the mass incarceration of
African Americans in the United States.1 According to the Pew Center on
the States, one in nine black males between the ages of 20 and 34 is
“behind bars,” a staggering number that has prompted scholars to draw
comparisons between black imprisonment today and the legal system of
racial segregation, or Jim Crow, in the American South.2 According to
criminal law scholar Michelle Alexander, mass incarceration rivals and in
some aspects even surpasses Jim Crow as a “racialized system of social
control,” condemning millions of blacks to a “hidden underworld of
legalized discrimination and permanent social exclusion” in the twentyfirst century. 3 Junking the shibboleth that American racial politics have
followed a line of “linear progress” over time, Alexander posits that “it is
not at all obvious that it would be better to be incarcerated for life for a
minor drug offense than to live with one’s family, earning an honest wage
under the Jim Crow regime.”4
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Others disagree. According to civil rights scholar James Forman
Jr., the Jim Crow analogy “oversimplifies the origins of mass
incarceration,” meanwhile “diminish[ing] our understanding of the
particular harms associated with the Old Jim Crow.”5 Forman explains
how African Americans themselves endorsed “punitive” anti-crime
measures in the 1970s and 80s, how violent crime played a role in the
incarceration story, and how black imprisonment disproportionately
impacts the black poor.6 Further, Forman notes that analogies between
mass incarceration and Jim Crow tend to de-emphasize the “brutal,
unremitting violence upon which Jim Crow depended.”7
Though Forman is right to underscore important differences
between mass incarceration and Jim Crow, he occludes one important
commonality between the two legal formations, a commonality that
bolsters Michelle Alexander’s thesis, though not in the way she describes.
As this Article shall demonstrate, both Jim Crow and mass incarceration
emerged not simply out of a tendency towards “unremitting violence,”
racial extremism, or conservative “backlash,” but progressive politics.8 To
demonstrate, this Article will proceed in four parts. Part I recovers the
moderate origins of the old Jim Crow, showing how progressive reformers
in the American South couched racial segregation and disfranchisement in
the rhetoric of reducing political corruption, preventing crime, and
providing blacks with important public accommodations. Part II shows
how similarly aspirational impulses helped to lay the foundations for mass
incarceration, recovering the Supreme Court’s efforts to improve police
procedure in the 1960s, particularly its inadvertent contribution to the rise
of aggressive, constitutionally protected strategies of stop and frisk. Part
III recovers the role of moderate politics in the rise of mass incarceration,
focusing on liberal support for the War on Drugs, meanwhile comparing
that support to moderate endorsements of Jim Crow laws in the turn-ofthe-century South. Finally, Part IV extends the analogy to gun control,
showing how federal gun laws popular among liberals have contributed to
the “entrapment” of black defendants in several midwestern states.
The road to prison, this Article concludes, has consistently been
paved with good intentions, progressive efforts at reform that have sought
to ameliorate racial injustice and reduce racial tension, albeit with perverse
results.
Progressivism here defined includes turn-of-the-century
progressives who worked to ameliorate tensions between rich and poor, as
well as progressive-minded liberals in the 1960s, 70s, and 80s; in essence
5

James Forman, Jr. Racial Critiques of Mass Incarceration: Beyond the New Jim Crow,
87 N.Y.U. L. REV. 23 (2012).
6
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87 N.Y.U. L. REV. 56, 57-58 (2012).
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political actors who acted out of a genuine interest in helping the
dispossessed, meanwhile failing to anticipate the evils of their policy
decisions. 9 Recognizing this is important, both for understanding the rise
of “racialized systems of social control,” and for comprehending racism
itself. 10 Though Alexander is not wrong to flag the dangers of backlash,
class politics, and extremism, her account creates the false impression that
the political sources of racial inequality are always the product of
relatively simple, even formulaic political patterns; the rich dividing the
poor along racial lines, for example, or whites simply legislating their
prejudice into law. Sadly, the reality is more complex. As this article
shall demonstrate, neither the old nor the new Jim Crow emerged simply
because white elites “appeal[ed] to the racism and vulnerability of lowerclass whites,” as Alexander claims. 11 Nor did racial segregation or mass
incarceration emerge simply because of “racial indifference,” a concept
that Alexander defines as “a lack of compassion and caring about race and
racial groups.”12 On the contrary, racialized systems of social control
derive their strength from a convergence of interests – to borrow from
Derrick Bell – including commendable aims like fighting corruption,
promoting peace, and protecting life.13 Indeed, critical to understanding
“how racial oppression actually works” is close attention to the manner in
which the evils of oppression stem not simply from animus or indifference
but also from the deliberate pursuit of the collective good.14
9

ANDERS WALKER, THE GHOST OF JIM CROW: HOW SOUTHERN MODERATES USED
BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION TO STALL CIVIL RIGHTS 8 (2009).
10
MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE AGE OF
COLORBLINDNESS 173 (2010).
11
MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE AGE OF
COLORBLINDNESS 16 (2010).
12
MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE AGE OF
COLORBLINDNESS 203 (2010).
13
I borrow the notion of interest convergence from Derrick Bell. Though Bell used the
term to explain why states move to protect the rights of minorities, I argue that it also
applies to state campaigns that hurt minorities. See Derrick Bell, Brown v. Board of
Education and the Interest-Convergence Dilemma, 93 HARVARD L. REV. 518 (1980).
14
MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE AGE OF
COLORBLINDNESS 183 (2010). As employed here, aspirational racism refers to policies
that advance the interests of a particular racial group, either by improving its health,
advancing its ideals, or protecting it from perceived threats. It is therefore related to
what Michel Foucault termed “biopolitics” namely a configuration of power around the
preservation and promotion of life, a “formative,” “ordering mechanism[]”harnessed to
“varied progressive projects.” See, e.g. ANN LAURA STOLER, RACE AND THE EDUCATION
OF DESIRE: FOUCAULT ’S HISTORY OF SEXUALITY AND THE COLONIAL ORDER OF THINGS
9 (1995). See also Simona Forti, The Biopolitics of Souls: Racism, Nazism, and Plato 34
POLITICAL THEORY 9 (2006) (discussing racism as an embodiment of metaphysical
ideals). For southern historians who argue that aspirational rhetoric operated essentially
as a ruse for rationalizing oppression, see C. VANN WOODWARD, THE STRANGE CAREER
rd
OF JIM CROW (3 ed. 1974); J. MORGAN KOUSSER, THE SHAPING OF SOUTHERN POLITICS:
SUFFRAGE RESTRICTION AND THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE ONE-PARTY SOUTH, 18801910 (1974); JOEL WILLIAMSON, THE CRUCIBLE OF RACE: BLACK-WHITE RELATIONS IN
THE AMERICAN SOUTH SINCE EMANCIPATION (1984); GLENDA ELIZABETH GILMORE,
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I. JIM CROW’S PROGRESSIVE ROOTS
To fully comprehend the analogy between mass incarceration and
Jim Crow, it is helpful to flag Michelle Alexander’s particular notion of
social control. According to Alexander, racial segregation and mass
incarceration both embody/ied “racialized” systems of “social control”
that in turn foster/ed a “racial caste system,” a term that Alexander defines
loosely to mean any system that locks “a stigmatized racial group” “into
an inferior position by law and custom,” regardless of whether those laws
and customs derive from direct racial animus or “indifference.”15 Though
mass incarceration differs from the “old” Jim Crow in that it does not rely
on overt racial classifications, the overall impact of America’s criminal
justice system on black felons, argues Alexander, nevertheless bears
striking similarities to the impact that segregation had on African
Americans in the pre-Brown South, including “disfranchisement,”
“exclusion from juries,” “racial segregation,” and the perpetuation of
“racial stigma.”16 To document the manner in which such burdens are tied
to criminal justice, Alexander expands her notion of mass incarceration to
include “the larger web of laws, rules, policies, and customs that control
those labeled criminals both in and out of prison,” allowing her to bring in
thousands of African Americans who leave prison each year only to “enter
a hidden underworld of legalized discrimination and permanent social
exclusion.”17
The idea of exclusion plays a prominent role in Alexander’s thesis,
tying her into a much larger historiography of Jim Crow segregation, one
that casts doubt on the causal elements of her argument.18 To
demonstrate, this section will place Alexander’s thesis within the larger
context of Jim Crow historiography, showing how it would be better
served by adopting a more nuanced attention to historian C. Vann
Woodward, and to his critics. As we shall see, the notion that white
“conservatives” simply offered the white poor a “racial bribe” misses
much of Woodward’s own story, in particular the role that progressive
rhetoric played in black disfranchisement and segregation. 19

GENDER AND JIM CROW: WOMEN AND THE POLITICS OF WHITE SUPREMACY IN NORTH
CAROLINA, 1896-1920 (1996).
15
MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE AGE OF
COLORBLINDNESS 12, 203 (2010).
16
MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE AGE OF
COLORBLINDNESS 192, 193, 197 (2010).
17
MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE AGE OF
COLORBLINDNESS 13 (2010).
18
See e.g., Howard Rabinowitz, From Exclusion to Segregation: Southern Race
Relations, 1865-1890, 63 JOURNAL OF AMERICAN HISTORY 325 (1976).
19
MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE AGE OF
COLORBLINDNESS 34 (2010). For the Woodward thesis, see C. VANN WOODWARD, THE
STRANGE CAREER OF JIM CROW 50 (3rd ed. 1974).
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Long before offering poor whites a racial “bribe,” southern
conservatives had themselves relied on black voters to bolster their power
from the end of Reconstruction through the 1880s. 20 By the 1890s,
however, an economic depression realigned black interests, pushing
African Americans to favor white “radicals,” or Populists, who sought to
forge a “pragmatic alliance” across racial lines and against economic
elites.21 Rather than “bribe” poor whites, those elites “bought” and
“intimidated” black voters into supporting them; undercutting populist
hopes of interracial reform.22 As populism collapsed, argues Woodward,
conservatives worked diligently to rework southern politics, assuaging
radical anger at their own manipulation of black votes by calling for
“disfranchisement of the Negro,” both as a “guarantee” that “white
factions” would not rally black support “in the future” and also as a
“progressive” measure aimed at halting political corruption. 23
This last point is significant. Though Woodward places ultimate
responsibility for the rise of Jim Crow on the shoulders of extremists, he
concedes that calls for black disfranchisement struck many at the time as a
“progressive” reform that challenged conservative interests, even as it
promised to clean up southern politics. 24 As Woodward explains it, “the
typical progressive reformer rode to power in the South on a
disfranchising or white-supremacy movement.”25 This was true in
Georgia, North Carolina, Virginia, and other states, so much so that
“[r]acism was conceived by some as the very foundation of southern
progressivism.”26
That racism could be progressive sounds alien to us today.
However, the racism that moved white voters to endorse Jim Crow in the
South in the 1890s was deeply intertwined with aspirational ideals, not just
clean government but other noble goals as well, like fighting crime. No
historian demonstrates this more starkly than Glenda Elizabeth Gilmore. 27
Focusing on North Carolina, Gilmore shows how a cadre of “young”
business-minded, “New White Men” sought power not only by employing
the progressive rhetoric of reducing corruption in government, but also by
emphasizing “safety of the home.”28 One such progressive, North
20

C. VANN WOODWARD, THE STRANGE CAREER OF JIM CROW 75-76 (3rd ed. 1974).
C. VANN WOODWARD, THE STRANGE CAREER OF JIM CROW 91, 45 (3rd ed. 1974). As
radical Populist Tom Watson of Georgia put it, “[y]ou are made to hate each other
because upon that hatred is rested the keystone of the arch of financial despotism which
enslaves you both.” C. VANN WOODWARD, THE STRANGE CAREER OF JIM CROW 62-3
(3rd ed. 1974).
22
C. VANN WOODWARD, THE STRANGE CAREER OF JIM CROW 79 (3rd ed. 1974).
23
C. VANN WOODWARD, THE STRANGE CAREER OF JIM CROW 83 (3rd ed. 1974).
24
C. VANN WOODWARD, THE STRANGE CAREER OF JIM CROW 83 (3rd ed. 1974).
25
C. VANN WOODWARD, THE STRANGE CAREER OF JIM CROW 91 (3rd ed. 1974).
26
C. VANN WOODWARD, THE STRANGE CAREER OF JIM CROW 91 (3rd ed. 1974).
27
GLENDA ELIZABETH GILMORE, GENDER & JIM CROW: WOMEN AND THE POLITICS OF
WHITE SUPREMACY IN NORTH CAROLINA, 1896-1920 (1996).
28
GLENDA ELIZABETH GILMORE, GENDER & JIM CROW: WOMEN AND THE POLITICS OF
WHITE SUPREMACY IN NORTH CAROLINA, 1896-1920 66, 85, 93 (1996).
21
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Carolina governor Charles Brantley Aycock, “exaggerated a series of sex
crimes and allegations in order to strike terror into the hearts of white
voters,” reframing segregation and disfranchisement as critical to the
protection of white women. 29 Though Aycock and his “New White”
conspirators knew such claims to be false, the extensive efforts they took
to manufacture a “rape scare” suggest that average white voters in the state
were unwilling to subordinate blacks without a pressing moral rationale:
eliminating sexual crime.30 Here, the fact that Aycock manipulated
progressive anti-crime rhetoric underscores the salience of that rhetoric to
the institutionalization of Jim Crow; whether its proponents believed it or
not.31
And Aycock did not stop there. In a move that was even more
“progressive,” he endorsed segregation as a means not of subordinating
blacks but preserving for them a base level of social services, including
education. 32 As Aycock explained it, Jim Crow saved African Americans
from an even worse fate than being relegated to separate, inferior
accommodations: the possibility that they might be denied all public
accommodations, a condition that historian Howard Rabinowitz has
termed “exclusion.”33 According to Rabinowitz, even worse fates could
have befallen blacks than segregation and disfranchisement, including not
just a blanket prohibition against all public services for blacks, but forced
removal from the South, even genocide. 34 Radical leaders like South
Carolina Governor “Pitchfork” Ben Tillman called for precisely such an
outcome, promising white voters in 1898 that African Americans needed
to either “remain subordinate or be exterminated.”35 Meanwhile, others
declared removal to be the key. According to South Carolina Senator
Matthew Calbraith Butler, for example, the United States government
should provide a place of emigration for blacks where African Americans
could “work out their own destiny.” 36 Popular author and Thomas Dixon
agreed, pushing for the colonization of blacks back to Africa.37
29

GLENDA ELIZABETH GILMORE, GENDER & JIM CROW: WOMEN AND THE POLITICS OF
WHITE SUPREMACY IN NORTH CAROLINA, 1896-1920, 83 (1996).
30
Gilmore discusses the evidentiary problems with the propaganda warning of a rape
scare in GLENDA ELIZABETH GILMORE, GENDER & JIM CROW: WOMEN AND THE POLITICS
OF WHITE SUPREMACY IN NORTH CAROLINA, 1896-1920 86-88, 94 (1996).
31
C. Vann Woodward substantiates this point. See C. VANN WOODWARD, THE STRANGE
CAREER OF JIM CROW 91-92 (3rd ed. 1974).
32
C. Vann Woodward substantiates this point. See C. VANN WOODWARD, THE STRANGE
CAREER OF JIM CROW 91-92 (3rd ed. 1974).
33
HOWARD N. RABINOWITZ, RACE RELATIONS IN THE URBAN SOUTH, 1865-1890 (1978);
JOHN W. CELL, THE HIGHEST STAGE OF WHITE SUPREMACY 175 (1982).
34
JOHN W. CELL, THE HIGHEST STAGE OF WHITE SUPREMACY 175 (1982).
35
STEPHEN KANTROWITZ, BEN TILLMAN & THE RECONSTRUCTION OF WHITE SUPREMACY
258 (2000); see also Charles Crowe, Racial Violence and Social Reform – Origins of the
Atlanta Riot of 1906, 53 J. OF NEGRO HIST. 234, 253 (1968).
36
Plans for the Negro, N.Y. OBSERVER, Oct. 12, 1899, at 41.
37
Charles Crowe, Racial Violence and Social Reform – Origins of the Atlanta Riot of
1906, 53 J. OF NEGRO HIST. 234, 245 (1968). For more on Dixon and the brand of
extremist politics that he endorsed, see GLENDA ELIZABETH GILMORE, GENDER AND JIM
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Even if removal and genocide were not likely outcomes, an
increasing number of historians have located the rise of Jim Crow in
policy initiatives that had little to do with bribing the poor. In North
Carolina, for example, the black poor proved less relevant than the black
middle class, whose success “set off alarms” among poor whites, even as
“[a] new assertive generation of middle-class African Americans” began
to “exercise” their rights in “daily actions” on the street.38 Such actions
often involved direct challenges to white authority, as happened in
Charlotte, North Carolina in 1882, when a middle class black teenager
named Jim Harris “pistol-whipped” a white man who had “insulted and
struck” one of his female friends. 39 According to Glenda Gilmore, such
instances of black middle class defiance stemmed from a very different
brand of class politics than the kind either Alexander or Woodward focus
on, not simply elite manipulation of the white poor so much as black
middle class challenges to white supremacy, a concept that Gilmore reads
through the southern analytic of “place.”40
Perhaps nowhere was the concept of place more contested than on
41
trains. “As the number of railroads” in the South “proliferated” in the
1880s, notes historian Edward Ayers, they created new unregulated spaces
that forced whites and blacks to mix in uncomfortably close quarters.42
Prior to then, most public accommodations in southern towns and cities
were segregated as a matter of custom, obviating the need for formal rules
governing interracial contact.43 However, the rise of trains threw blacks
and whites together in close quarters, a problem that became particularly
acute in first class cars where affluent whites took umbrage at “educated”
and “relatively well-to-do” blacks who “insisted on imposing themselves
on the white people” in the best cars, an increasing problem as “black
wealth” increased “substantially” in the 1880s. 44 On train after train,
CROW: WOMEN AND THE POLITICS OF WHITE SUPREMACY IN NORTH CAROLINA (1996);
C. VANN WOODWARD, THE STRANGE CAREER OF JIM CROW (1974).
38
GLENDA ELIZABETH GILMORE, GENDER & JIM CROW: WOMEN AND THE POLITICS OF
WHITE SUPREMACY IN NORTH CAROLINA, 1896-1920, 15 (1996).
39
GLENDA ELIZABETH GILMORE, GENDER & JIM CROW: WOMEN AND THE POLITICS OF
WHITE SUPREMACY IN NORTH CAROLINA, 1896-1920, 74 (1996).
40
GLENDA ELIZABETH GILMORE, GENDER & JIM CROW: WOMEN AND THE POLITICS OF
WHITE SUPREMACY IN NORTH CAROLINA, 1896-1920, 3, 75 (1996).
41
EDWARD AYERS, THE PROMISE OF THE NEW SOUTH: LIFE AFTER RECONSTRUCTION,
137, 140 (1992).
42
EDWARD AYERS, THE PROMISE OF THE NEW SOUTH: LIFE AFTER RECONSTRUCTION,
140 (1992).
43
EDWARD AYERS, THE PROMISE OF THE NEW SOUTH: LIFE AFTER RECONSTRUCTION,
136 (1992). See also, Howard N. Rabinowitz, From Exclusion to Segregation: Southern
Race Relations, 1865-1890, 63 JOURNAL OF AMERICAN HISTORY 325 (1976); Howard N.
Rabinowitz, More Than the Woodward Thesis: Assessing the Strange Career of Jim
Crow 75 JOURNAL OF AMERICAN HISTORY 842 (1988).
44
EDWARD AYERS, THE PROMISE OF THE NEW SOUTH: LIFE AFTER RECONSTRUCTION,
140 (1992).
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altercations between flustered white elites and “assertive” black elites
exploded, leading to “overt conflict” and “violence.”45
Though not a story of elite manipulation of the white poor, battles
on trains played a critical role in the “first wave of segregation law[s]” to
emerge in the post-Reconstruction South, forming a cornerstone in the
racialized system of social control known as Jim Crow.46 For example,
blacks who were denied access to first class cars in the 1880s “resorted to
the law in increasing numbers,” leading to a string of judicial decisions
requiring either that railroads reimburse African Americans for their lost
seats or, more commonly, provide equal accommodations to white and
black passengers.47 Separating passengers by race, argued state and
federal judges alike, encouraged “peace, order, convenience, and
comfort,” all laudable ideals. 48
Despite judicial orders that railroads provide separate
accommodations, railroad companies balked at the “considerable expense
and trouble of running twice the number of cars.”49 Outraged, legislators
across the South then moved to require separate accommodations by
statute, leading Tennessee to commence the “first legislative attempt at
statewide segregation” in the South in 1881. 50 Other states followed,
stressing not simply that whites be free from black encroachments but also
that blacks be protected from white abuses.51 For example, Florida
enacted a law in 1887 holding that “[n]o white person shall be permitted to
ride in a [N]egro car or to insult or annoy any [N]egro in such car.” 52
Even if middle class whites did not want middle class blacks in their cars,
in other words, they also did not want poorly behaved whites embarrassing
them by disturbing black passengers, pointing to segregation’s complex
role as a disciplinary mechanism targeting members of both races.53
Contrary to Alexander’s story that Jim Crow simply targeted the
working class, the regulation of trains in the South indicates that the
45

EDWARD AYERS, THE PROMISE OF THE NEW SOUTH: LIFE AFTER RECONSTRUCTION,
139 (1992).
46
EDWARD AYERS, THE PROMISE OF THE NEW SOUTH: LIFE AFTER RECONSTRUCTION,
145 (1992).
47
EDWARD AYERS, THE PROMISE OF THE NEW SOUTH: LIFE AFTER RECONSTRUCTION,
142 (1992).
48
EDWARD AYERS, THE PROMISE OF THE NEW SOUTH: LIFE AFTER RECONSTRUCTION,
142 (1992).
49
EDWARD AYERS, THE PROMISE OF THE NEW SOUTH: LIFE AFTER RECONSTRUCTION,
142 (1992).
50
EDWARD AYERS, THE PROMISE OF THE NEW SOUTH: LIFE AFTER RECONSTRUCTION,
143 (1992). See also C. VANN WOODWARD, THE STRANGE CAREER OF JIM CROW 97 (3rd
ed. 1974).
51
EDWARD AYERS, THE PROMISE OF THE NEW SOUTH: LIFE AFTER RECONSTRUCTION,
143-4 (1992).
52
EDWARD AYERS, THE PROMISE OF THE NEW SOUTH: LIFE AFTER RECONSTRUCTION,
143-4 (1992). See also HOWARD N. RABINOWITZ, RACE, ETHNICITY, AND
URBANIZATION: SELECTED ESSAYS 155-6 (1994).
53
EDWARD AYERS, THE PROMISE OF THE NEW SOUTH: LIFE AFTER RECONSTRUCTION,
143-4 (1992).
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origins of segregation lay partly in a revolt by white middle class
progressives, or “New White Men,” against white elites, particularly
corporate elites who owned and operated trains.54 In state after state,
explains historian Edward Ayers, “one politician after another” “turned to
the control of corporations,” particularly railroads, hoping to stem their
“grasping, selfish, tyrannical,” and “overbearing demeanor.”55 Though
blacks protested their eviction from white cars, in other words, the whites
orchestrating those evictions did not necessarily represent the white
financial elite, but rather a rising middle class in the South who sought not
simply to divide and conquer the poor, but also to regulate the rich. 56
Indeed, if the southern middle class wanted anything, it was to curb both
“greedy monopolies” and also “unruly citizens.” 57 Segregation, to them,
embodied a “sophisticated, modern, managed” approach to race relations,
an approach that quickly spread from train cars to train stations to all
manner of other public spaces, including waiting rooms, restrooms, water
fountains, and so on.58
Recovering the origins of segregation on trains helps to
demonstrate the manner in which progressive goals ended up having
profoundly repressive effects. Rather than examples of white elites
manipulating the white poor, train statutes embodied a very different
regulatory move, an effort by middle class whites to police their own
ranks and also to protect the peace and tranquility of first class passengers
white and black. 59
That racial segregation may have been a modern, even progressive
solution to problems of racial strife is a point that C. Vann Woodward
concedes briefly in Strange Career, and that subsequent historians have
elaborated upon.60 For example, both John W. Cell and Howard
Rabinowitz argue that segregation was a moderate alternative to even
harsher policies of racial exclusion. 61 According to Cell, “the ideology of
segregation was not the contribution of the most fanatical, ignorant,
unbending racists of the period” but rather a legal regime sponsored by
54
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“moderate men” who “sought civility, peace, and harmony.” 62 According
to Rabinowitz, Radical Republicans first introduced segregation to the
South as part of a larger effort to provide blacks access to services that had
previously been denied them, including public schools, welfare, and health
care.63 Such arguments lend credence to Alexander’s point that the
exclusionary effects of mass incarceration may actually be more damaging
than Jim Crow; even as they underscore the larger conclusion, counter to
Alexander, that new systems of racial control are often rationalized in
progressive, forward-looking terms – not simply as expressions of animus
or indifference.64
Alexander’s failure to adequately capture the aspirational rhetoric
of white southerners post-Reconstruction, prevents her from adequately
explaining how Jim Crow emerged and – more importantly – how mass
incarceration echoes it. The next section will demonstrate how moderate,
even liberal reform led to a similar pattern at mid-century, as exemplified
by the rise of formalized rules sanctioning police stop and frisks, a
technique that Alexander cites repeatedly as a contributor to mass
incarceration.65 Proponents of such reforms included northern liberals
desperate to correct unforeseen, negative consequences of the Supreme
Court’s pro-defendant ruling in Mapp v. Ohio. Much like the moderate
politics that animated the first Jim Crow; such efforts engendered
unexpected, arguably perverse results.

II. THE STRANGE CAREER OF STOP AND FRISK
Even as progressive politics contributed to the rise of racial
segregation, so too did liberal initiatives confound black interests in the
civil rights era. Few examples provide a better illustration than Mapp v.
Ohio, a pivotal case in the Warren Court’s criminal procedure
revolution. 66 As this section shall demonstrate, the Court’s effort to curb
police abuses against blacks in Mapp in 1961 ended up having an
unanticipated effect, worsening police minority tensions in urban centers
like New York. Praised by liberals for extending the exclusionary rule to
the states, Mapp pushed many police to adopt aggressive means of
questioning and evidence gathering on the street, prompting moderate
reformers to lobby for a structured approach to stopping suspicious
62

JOHN W. CELL, THE HIGHEST STAGE OF WHITE SUPREMACY: THE ORIGINS OF
SEGREGATION IN SOUTH AFRICA AND THE AMERICAN SOUTH 180 (1982).
63
HOWARD N. RABINOWITZ, RACE, ETHNICITY, AND URBANIZATION: SELECTED ESSAYS
1138-140 (1994).
64
MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE AGE OF
COLORBLINDNESS 22 (2010).
65
MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE AGE OF
COLORBLINDNESS 77, 103, 124-25 (2010).
66
PRISCILLA H. MACHADO ZOTTI, INJUSTICE FOR ALL: MAPP VS. OHIO AND THE FOURTH
AMENDMENT 170 (2005).

11

persons. In 1965, the New York State Legislature heeded such efforts by
adopting a “stop and frisk” law that ultimately survived Supreme Court
review, contributing to what Alexander terms the first phase of mass
incarceration.67
By recovering the progressive origins of stop and frisk, this section
seeks to make two points. First, the origins of policies that increased rates
of minority incarceration in America did not necessarily result from
conservative efforts to divide the poor along racial lines. Second,
Alexander occludes an important component of the mass incarceration
story, namely liberal efforts to improve racial inequality by emphasizing
procedural rather than substantive reform. Though scholars tend to cite
1968 as a key turning point in Warren Court jurisprudence, a moment
when liberal impulses on the Court succumbed to a conservative “counterrevolution,” this section suggests a more fractured narrative – one in
which liberals and conservatives alike tolerated expansions of private
liberty so long as such expansions did not threaten public violence.68
The case began when police discovered obscene material in the
home of Cleveland resident Dollree Mapp following an aggressive,
warrantless search.69 Though Mapp’s attorneys fought to exclude the
evidence at trial, they abandoned that position on appeal, arguing instead
that Ohio’s obscenity statute was unconstitutionally vague and that
Mapp’s arrest was so outrageous as to warrant an acquittal.70 This latter
argument followed Rochin v. California, a 1952 Supreme Court case
chastising police for ordering a defendant’s stomach pumped to retrieve
heroine, something the Court found so egregious that it not only “shocked
the conscience,” but violated the Constitution. 71 Just as unconstitutional,
argued Mapp’s counsel, was Ohio’s obscenity law, a relatively recent

67
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measure that expanded criminal liability from manufacturers and sellers of
pornography to private citizens. 72
Yet, it was not the outrageous nature of Ohio’s obscenity statute so
much as the “racist police abuse” in Mapp that “convinced” the Supreme
Court “to extend federal supervision to state criminal justice.”73 Ignoring
the obscenity issue, the Court moved instead to incorporate the
exclusionary rule to the states, suddenly protecting average citizens from
warrantless searches by local police.74 For many at the time, the decision
constituted a clear victory for civil rights, and seemed to have an
immediate positive impact on law enforcement.75 According to Richard
Kuh, Secretary of the New York State District Attorney’s Association,
police did in fact become more serious about acquiring warrants before
conducting searches of private homes following the ruling. 76 Prior to
Mapp, claimed Kuh, officers rarely requested a warrant before searching
an individual’s private “apartment, home, flat, [or] loft.”77 “All this has
changed,” he argued in September of 1962, noting that tendencies toward
ignoring warrant requirements “changed overnight.”78
However, Mapp engendered unanticipated reactions on the street.
Almost immediately, arrests for illegal lottery or “policy” violations
dropped in New York City, totaling a thirty-five percent decline by the
end of the year.79 Convictions for “narcotics misdemeanor offenses” also
dropped, along with convictions for “contraband – possession of weapons,
[and] obscene prints.”80 Such declines, declared law enforcement,
stemmed from officer confusion over whether they could lawfully search
suspects who were not officially under arrest.81
72
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While a drop in arrests might be taken as a positive for blacks on
the street, police testimony became increasingly “improbable” in cases
that did go to trial, many officers testifying that suspects simply
“removed” objects from their pockets and “threw” them to the ground,
dispensing with the need for a search.82 Meanwhile, police assigned to
search private homes began increasingly to claim that they had been
“invited” in by defendants, again precluding the need for a warrant.83 Not
only did Mapp lower arrest rates, in other words, it also encouraged police
to stretch the truth, telling more elaborate “stories” to bolster the arrests
they did make.84
In a study of almost 4,000 arrests, New York Legal Services
offered hard data that Mapp negatively impacted police testimony,
pushing officers to claim that suspects mysteriously “dropped” contraband
before being approached and searched. 85
The New York Police
Department (NYPD) reported a 71.8 percent spike in such “dropsies”
during the year immediately following Mapp.86 Meanwhile, reports that
police found contraband “hidden on the person” of suspects declined
significantly at precisely the same time, indicating that police were
suddenly cautious about admitting to searches. 87
82
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An NYPD officer provided a clue into the new dynamics of postMapp evidence recovery during an illegal search trial in New York City
on September 12, 1962.88 Charged with unlawfully searching a suspect,
the officer claimed that he “frisked” suspects but did not actually search
them.89 The officer then demonstrated a standard frisk before the court, a
relatively violent maneuver that aimed to shake evidence to the ground.90
Rather than simply pat down the suspect’s clothing, for example, the
patrolman “grabbed” the suspect “and practically lifted him off his feet”;
meanwhile shaking him to loosen any items that might be secreted in his
pockets, waistband, or belt.91 As a cigarette lighter and pair of eyeglasses
“fell” to the floor, the manner in which a frisk might generate a drop
suddenly became apparent, leaving open the question whether Mapp’s
prohibition on searches also applied to frisks, even forceful ones like the
one demonstrated by the officer.92
Even if officers decided against frisks, police developed other
means of procuring evidence from suspects without resorting to a search.93
In Cincinnati, for example, patrolmen “rush[ed]” suspects, “hoping to
produce a panic” that would then lead them to “visibly discard”
evidence.94 Here too, the Court’s application of the exclusionary rule had
a counterintuitive effect; increasing the likelihood that police would
engage in threatening behavior to get suspects to drop evidence.95
Police efforts to induce dropped evidence indicate that rather than
improve police conduct, Mapp actually intensified the use of force, lying,
and deception, particularly on the street.96 However, even Mapp’s effect
on the search of homes and apartments came into question. According to
New York Legal Services, for example, the actual location of arrests
generally seemed to migrate out of private rooms and into public spaces
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following the decision. To illustrate, the location of most arrests prior to
Mapp were streets (35%) and “unexplained rooms” (26%) meaning
“rooms entered without explanation by the police.” 97 Following the
ruling, however, police reported lower numbers of arrests in unexplained
rooms, dropping them from 26% to 17.6%, meanwhile increasing arrests
in “hallways,” “roof landings,” and “basements.”98
Just as Mapp may have pressured officers to acquire warrants
before entering homes, so too did the decision seem to refocus police
attention on public space.99
Rather than simply improve police
professionalism, in other words, the decision also influenced the contours
of police corruption, removing it from private homes to public areas
(streets, hallways, roof landings, and basements), where police could then
shake down suspects for evidence. 100 As New York Legal Services
described it, officers simply “stopped entering private rooms” and turned
instead to spending “more time in the streets and halls.” 101 Rather than
“level the playing field” between rich and poor, in other words, Mapp
simply provided more privacy to the already well-off, particularly those
wealthy enough to conduct their social and professional lives behind
closed doors.102 Conversely, poor residents of cramped apartments and
public housing projects – those most likely to utilize public spaces and the
streets for social interaction – –found themselves the targets of intensified
police searches in their halls, landings, and sidewalks; all factors
increasing the likelihood that African Americans might be incarcerated for
random, search-generated crimes. 103
97
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As Mapp engendered negative effects, reformers moved to clarify
the constitutional landscape, pushing the playing field even further in the
direction of mass incarceration, albeit unwittingly. By March of 1962, for
example, New York Governor Nelson Rockefeller joined police in
declaring that “confusion” had become Mapp’s primary contribution to the
law of search and arrest.104 To rectify matters, Rockefeller endorsed a
statute authorizing officers “to search and question a person” suspected of
committing a crime “without making an arrest.”105 The law allowed for
pat down searches in cases where police possessed a reasonable suspicion
that the suspect might be armed, solving one of Mapp’s primary
ambiguities.106
Not everyone approved. Black leaders in New York objected to
the stop and frisk legislation, arguing “that it would help create a ‘police
state’ by subjecting the people of their districts to ‘even greater abuse than
they now suffer at the hands of police.’”107 At the time, the “highest
concentration” of arrests in New York occurred in predominantly black
neighborhoods, most notably Harlem. 108 According to black politicians,
New York’s stop and frisk law would “allow policemen to ‘push around’
citizens and permit them to operate as ‘the Gestapo.’”109 Such criticism
indicated that not everyone, particularly not African Americans, believed
that the corrupt practices engendered by Mapp would necessarily be
solved by sanctioning stop and frisks. 110
While black fears proved prescient, the Supreme Court of the
United States approved the Empire State’s law in a 1968 case styled
Sibron v. New York, holding that officers could “stop and frisk” suspects
so long as they possessed “reasonable suspicion” that individuals were
either “engaged in criminal activity” or posed “a danger.”111 Though
criticized by black leaders, the Court confessed to having noble objectives,
even citing the excesses generated by Mapp, including its encouragement
of police tactics aimed at creating the illusion of dropped evidence.112
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Further, the Court acknowledged in a companion case styled Terry v. Ohio
that “frisking” had indeed become “a severely exacerbating factor in
police-community tensions.”113
Much like early Jim Crow laws found themselves packaged in
progressive rhetoric, so too did the formalization of stop and frisk rules in
New York City provide a case study in the complexities, and evils, of
reform. Though stop and frisk would contribute to mass incarceration, the
formalization of the procedure emerged as a moderate solution to postMapp confusion, a corrective to an unforeseen development not of
reactionary racism, but the Warren Court’s criminal procedure revolution.
Michelle Alexander misses this, concluding simply that the “first step” in
the mass incarceration of blacks was the Supreme Court’s decision “to
grant law enforcement officials extraordinary discretion regarding whom
to stop, search, arrest, and charge for drug offenses,” i.e. Terry v. Ohio.114
Rather than simply a conservative plot to divide the working class,
however, Mapp’s impact on stop and frisk resulted from a more complex
sequence of events, suggesting a story about reform, reaction, and
compromise, a convergence of conservative and liberal interests that
contributed to mass incarceration. 115
As the next section shall
demonstrate, a similar narrative haunted the War on Drugs.
III. THE LIBERAL WAR ON DRUGS
Progressive reforms that rendered evil results did not end with the
exclusionary rule. As race riots drew national attention to the American
ghetto in the 1960s, liberals began to lament the profusion of controlled
substances in predominantly poor, black neighborhoods, prompting calls
for harsher penalties to protect African American communities. 116 As
James Forman, Jr. shows, even “black activists” requested such penalties,
a point that Michelle Alexander downplays; blaming harsh drug policies
on conservative efforts to break up “a solid liberal coalition based on
economic interests of the poor and the working and lower-middle
classes.”117 Though conservatives did seek working and lower-middle
class votes, the War on Drugs proved more complicated than Alexander
implies, a point this section shall demonstrate by focusing on liberal
113
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support for heightened penalties that would, by the end of the twentieth
century, contribute greatly to mass incarceration in the United States. 118
Launched in the 1980s, the War on Drugs initially began as an
effort to “go beyond traditional law enforcement,” by focusing on
“education,” “treatment,” “research” and “foreign intervention,” a
campaign that garnered support from liberals and conservatives alike.119
To illustrate, one of the earliest proponents of the war was Democratic
Senator Joseph Biden, who became “convinced that the government
needed a cabinet-level director of narcotics policy,” or drug “czar” to
coordinate federal domestic and foreign efforts to thwart drug
trafficking.120 Meanwhile, liberals like Massachusetts Senator Edward
Kennedy lobbied for uniform sentencing guidelines, hoping “to reduce the
number of cases in which judges in different courts imposed widely
varying sentences,” particularly in cases involving minorities. 121 Though
“well intended,” such guidelines turned out to have a negative impact on
blacks, partly because of poor planning.122 For example, even though drug
sentences were set under the guidelines, “[m]id-level” dealers, who tended
to be white, found that they were able to procure lower sentences by
exchanging lower charges for “fingering higher-ups,” while lower level
dealers, who tended to be black, “had no such bargaining chips [and]
ended up getting higher sentences.”123
Just as sentencing guidelines emerged out of a series of poorly
planned, unintentional, yet frequently well-meaning initiatives, so too did
liberals endorse the decision to increase penalties for crack cocaine in
1986 – a move that Alexander argues “greatly exacerbated racial
118
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disparities in incarceration rates.”124 “Lacking detailed information,”
officials on all sides of the political spectrum began to call for increased
penalties for crack in 1985, after a series of news stories linking the drug
to violence began to make national headlines. 125 Early proponents of such
a move included popular liberals like Democratic Senator Gary Hart, who
claimed that crack caused “raging paranoia” and “senseless deaths.”126
Democratic Senator Lawton Chiles of Florida declared that crack turned
users into “slaves” while black Senator Charlie Rangel joined Nancy
Reagan’s “Just Say No” to drugs campaign, even as he declared that
“[w]hat is most frightening about crack is that it made cocaine widely
available and affordable for abuse among our youth.” 127 Though
Republican Senator Bob Dole recommended a mandatory minimum for
crack “20 times higher” than for powder cocaine, it was Democrats who
proposed a 100 to 1 ratio, all in the hopes of doing “something to save the
black community.”128 The death of black college basketball player Len
Bias in June 1986 only intensified liberal furor, speeding enactment of the
Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986 establishing substantially different penalties
for crack versus powder cocaine.129
Though Alexander cites the 1986 Anti-Abuse Act’s role in
spurring “racial disparities in incarceration rates,” she fails to adequately
account for the role that liberal hopes and aspirational rhetoric played in
the legislative history of the act.130 Instead, she focuses single-mindedly
on moves by “the Reagan administration” to “publicize the emergence of
crack” as part of a larger, “strategic effort to build public and legislative
support” for the War on Drugs, which was announced in 1982, “before
crack became an issue in the media” 131 However, Republicans were
actually “taken aback” that Democrats pushed for longer sentences than
“the traditionally hardline Republicans had in mind.”132 Further, news of
crack’s destructive effects pushed liberals to call for a de-emphasis on
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Columbian cartels and a renewed focus on urban communities, inspiring
noted liberals like New York Mayor Edward Koch to declare that it was
“time to raise the battle flag” on drugs in 1988.133 Others followed,
arguing as Princeton Professor John J. Dilulio, Jr. did in 1993 that “[n]o
new engines of inner-city job growth and revitalization can be started
unless and until the drug-and-crime epidemic is checked,” a move that
warranted “increas[ing] our big-city police forces and prison capacity as
much as is necessary to make inner-city criminals and street gangsters
aware that we are fighting a war on drugs.”134
As Dilulio indicates – and Alexander argues – the War on Drugs
did contribute directly to the evil of mass incarceration. However, the
origins of that war stemmed not simply from a conservative conspiracy, as
Alexander implies, but a complex set of concerns, including a liberal
desire to help minorities trapped in high crime neighborhoods. By
ignoring this side of the story, Alexander provides only a partial account
of “how racial oppression actually works,” meanwhile missing a key
parallel between mass incarceration and the old Jim Crow, namely the role
that progressive politics and positive aspirations played in the creation of
both regimes.135
Yet another problem with Alexander’s comparison between mass
incarceration and the old Jim Crow relates to her larger point about racial
caste. Though she is certainly right to claim that today’s criminal justice
system creates an “undercaste” of ex-convicts, it actually does much more
than that.136 Like the criminal penalties invoked when individuals violated
Jim Crow laws, so too do current criminal penalties punish poor,
unskilled, and uneducated minorities who seek to escape their lower class
predicament. As sociologist Jennifer Hamer notes in her recent study of
life and crime in East St. Louis, Illinois; African Americans living in
poverty-stricken, predominantly black areas – whether inner cities or
suburbs – face few legitimate avenues of upward mobility. 137 Cursed with
inferior schools, limited opportunities, and no money, the isolated poor
rely heavily on crime, whether prostitution or drugs, to escape
deprivation.138 Though such individuals may be able to scrape out an
existence on minimum wage jobs and legitimate part-time work, what
Hamer calls “clean” hustles, their hopes of rising out of the lower class
133
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often hinge on resorting to some kind of illegal activity, or “dirty
hustle.”139 “In a poor place like East St. Louis,” notes Hamer, “the
decision to hustle is normal,” rational, and one of the few available options
for those desiring “something better.”140
If Alexander placed more emphasis on Hamer’s rationalization of
the hustle, an acknowledgment that crime provides an important, available
escape from caste, then she would be able to bolster her own argument
about the “many parallels” between mass incarceration and Jim Crow, also
a system that criminalized black efforts to transcend their plight.141
However, placing more emphasis on reasons why disadvantaged
individuals might legitimately decide to commit crime would presumably
undermine Alexander’s single-minded claim that both mass incarceration
and Jim Crow derive from conservative “divide-and-conquer” politics,
forcing her instead to make the less polemical point that a broad
constellation of forces actually explains mass incarceration.142 Some of
these forces undoubtedly stem from conservative politics, while others
involve minority efforts to rise out of poverty, not to mention liberal
efforts to help minorities that have gone horribly awry, engendering
perverse results.
Liberal support for harsh sentences remains the most interesting
aspect of America’s mass incarceration story, yet Alexander largely
ignores it. Her occlusion marks perhaps the greatest weakness of her Jim
Crow analogy, muddling her history of racialized systems of social
control, meanwhile obscuring prescriptive solutions for dismantling those
systems. For example, Alexander concludes her study by asking why the
“civil rights community” has “been so slow to acknowledge” the problem
of mass incarceration in America.143 She posits that one problem has been
an over-emphasis on litigation as a means of social change, together with a
growing rift between civil rights lawyers and those most vulnerable to the
criminal justice system. 144 Missing is sufficient acknowledgment of the
bipartisan zeal for punishment that swept the nation in the 1980s and 90s,
spurred by conservatives and liberals alike who believed that
imprisonment might actually help the poor.145

139

JENNIFER F. HAMER, ABANDONED IN THE HEARTLAND: WORK, FAMILY, AND LIVING IN
EAST ST. LOUIS 105 (2011).
140
JENNIFER F. HAMER, ABANDONED IN THE HEARTLAND: WORK, FAMILY, AND LIVING IN
EAST ST. LOUIS 105 (2011).
141
MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE AGE OF
COLORBLINDNESS 17 (2010).
142
MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE AGE OF
COLORBLINDNESS 34 (2010).
143
MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE AGE OF
COLORBLINDNESS 223 (2010).
144
MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE AGE OF
COLORBLINDNESS 225 (2010).
145
MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE AGE OF
COLORBLINDNESS 229 (2010).

22

Though liberal efforts to embrace the “most oppressed” actually
contributed to mass incarceration, Alexander keeps her sights on
conservatives, arguably missing an opportunity to accomplish her ultimate
objective, namely winning support for dismantling the American prison
state. For example, Alexander might be able to pick up conservative
supporters by selling mass incarceration as a misguided effort at big
government, stressing the waste involved in providing “[f]ederal grant
money for drug enforcement” meanwhile maintaining a massive “criminal
justice bureaucracy.”146 Such concerns could then be merged with a more
traditionally liberal compassion for the poor, all the while marshaling her
data to prove that lowering criminal sentences and ending the War on
Drugs makes bipartisan sense. However, such a move would require
junking her divide and conquer thesis in favor of a more nuanced attention
to the evils wrought by liberal reform.147 As the next section shall
demonstrate, a similar argument could be brought to bear on the question
of guns.

IV. THE LIBERAL WAR ON GUNS
A final critique of Alexander’s thesis emerges from yet another
field that has enjoyed liberal support but contributed to the mass
incarceration of African Americans, namely federal gun regulation.
Pursuant to 21 U.S.C. §846 and 18 U.S.C. §924, defendants found in
possession of firearms who either have past felony convictions or
involvement in drug trafficking, face additional prison time for carrying a
weapon.148
The manner in which such gun regulations contribute to mass
incarceration recently became evident in several Midwestern states as
federal agents staged elaborate stings to net defendants suspected of drug
distribution. To take just one example, the federal Bureau of Alcohol,
Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF) joined city police in St. Louis,
Missouri in a four month joint operation during the spring of 2013 that
netted 159 defendants and 267 guns.149 Though hailed by city officials as
a victory against violent crime, the overwhelming number of defendants
apprehended by the ATF turned out to be African American, even as
questions arose concerning the predatory nature of the operation.150 For
146
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example, “court records and interviews” revealed that the ATF had relied
on three primary strategies for apprehending suspects in St. Louis: 1)
“street-level drug purchases and arrests,” 2) “a sting involving a fake drug
stash house,” and 3) a “St. Louis storefront used to buy guns 151
In the case of the storefront, federal agents opened a tattoo parlor
and then repeatedly asked customers if they might be able to sell them
firearms and drugs. 152 Meanwhile, the stash house scheme featured an
“undercover agent pretending to be a disgruntled drug courier” who
actively “recruit[ed] others willing to rob a stash house claimed to be
packed with drugs, and guarded by armed members of a fictional drug
ring.”153 Once agents identified a “prospective” robber, they would then
“repeatedly” ask that individual if they were “prepared to go through with
the plan” and, if so, whether they could procure a weapon “to pull it
off.”154 Once the unwitting robber acquired a weapon to conduct the
imagined federal scheme, “[a]gents and police” would “swoop” down and
arrest them. 155 Finally, federal agents conducted a series of “street-level
drug purchases” during which undercover officers alternately purchased
drugs and guns, only to then arrest the surprised sellers for federal
offenses. 156
Defense attorneys in St. Louis criticized several aspects of the ATF
tactics, particularly the phony drug house raids. According to them,
federal agents “lured” unwitting, “nonviolent drug dealers” into the drug
raid scheme “with promises of huge payouts” that attracted individuals
who would not otherwise have committed a home invasion, meanwhile
using the “fictional amounts of drugs” invented by police to charge the
defendants with federal narcotics offenses. 157
Similar operations in other states incurred similar criticism. For
example, a “fake ATF store” in Milwaukee drew criticism for “offering
such high prices for guns that some were bought from local retailers and
immediately resold to the agents.”158 Meanwhile, Judge Richard Posner of
the Seventh Circuit argued that a fake ATF stash house scheme in Chicago
presented sufficient evidence of entrapment to be submitted to a jury
151
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precisely because it involved big money inducements. 159 According to
Posner, “extraordinary inducements” demonstrate “that the defendant’s
commission of the crime for which he’s being prosecuted is not reliable
evidence that he was predisposed to commit it.”160 In the Chicago case,
styled U.S. v. Kindle, one of the defendants “had never robbed a stash
house,” nor had he ever “been convicted of a drug offense.” 161 In fact,
after being released from prison in 2005 for an unrelated offense, the
defendant “had tried to go straight – moving away from the city in which
he’d lived and had had criminal associates and getting a legal job.”162
Convinced that the ATF had induced a reformed offender back into a life
of crime, Posner lamented that the defendant “had earned his GED, an
associate’s degree, and three vocational certificates in prison, and upon
release had devoted personal time to volunteer activities.” 163 Despite
such good works, however, the defendant nevertheless proved vulnerable
to the government’s ridiculously high offer of “5 to 7 kilograms of cocaine
with a street value of $135,000 to $189,000” for completion of the phony
raid; an inducement “unlike any Mayfield” had ever seen. 164 According to
Posner, “a reasonable jury could have found that [the defendant] was not a
stash house robber, or even a drug dealer of any sort, was not predisposed
to attempt a stash house robbery, and accepted the invitation because of
financial desperation.” 165 Put simply, ATF stash house schemes amounted
to a “disreputable tactic” employed by law enforcement to arrest
minorities, “increase the amount of drugs that can be attributed to the
persons stung,” and “jack up their sentences.”166
That St. Louis Police Chief Sam Dotson praised such stash house
schemes proved uncontroversial until conservatives in the state proposed a
bill aimed at curtailing federal enforcement of gun laws in the state.167
Styled House Bill 436, the measure represented, for many, a reactionary
move by conservatives to impugn talk of tightening gun regulations
following the massacre of school children by a deranged individual in
Sandy Hook, Connecticut in December 2012.168
However, even as
liberals across the state lamented the bill, few recognized the law as a
159
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potential brake on federal prosecutions of overwhelmingly black criminal
defendants in St. Louis and Kansas City … except for Chief Dotson, who
wrote an impassioned letter endorsing a gubernatorial veto of the
statute.169 As Dotson described it, the conservative gun law would disrupt
joint operations between the city’s police department and federal law
enforcement; a problem since “federal agencies provide important
resources in personnel, equipment, and intelligence about violent
criminals.”170 Dotson’s public protest revealed an arguably bizarre
synergy between robust endorsements of the Second Amendment and the
curtailment of mass incarceration in America.171
While Alexander focuses her critique of mass incarceration on
conservative social policies stemming from the Reagan-era War on Drugs,
the St. Louis story suggests a more complicated scenario. 172 There, the
ATF’s aggressive enforcement of federal gun laws, an issue that liberals
tend to support, contributed directly to the “entrapment” of African
Americans who might otherwise have remained clear of prison. 173 At least
this was the position of 7th Circuit Judge Richard Posner, who expressed
open disdain for federal gun control tactics in United States v. Kindle.174
However, lifting such regulations garnered little support on the
175
left.
On the contrary, it was conservative support for the Second
Amendment that promised tactics likely to disrupt black incarceration.
Even if House Bill 436 represented an unreasonable means of slowing
minority imprisonment in Missouri, in other words, the mere fact that rural
conservatives flaunted the police suggests a potential paradigm shift in the
politics of crime control in America.
According to Alexander,
conservatives and police bonded for much of the post-Brown era, jointly
celebrating the War on Drugs. 176 However, that bond seems to have come
unglued as conservative fears of government overreaching provide new
rhetorical possibilities for curtailing criminal justice excess. Here, the
rhetoric of freedom and firearms provides a new frame, perhaps a more
169
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powerful frame, than Alexander’s emphasis on the need to develop “an
ethic of genuine care, compassion, and concern for every human being.” 177
Precisely such rhetoric was invoked in Missouri to kill House Bill 436,
even as the ATF proffered its irresistible stash house schemes. 178
V. CONCLUSION
That liberals endorsed both federal gun control and the War on
Drugs is not something Michelle Alexander pays sufficient attention to in
The New Jim Crow. 179 Yet, liberal zeal for incarceration goes to the heart
of her book, undermining her thesis that harsh sentences derive almost
entirely from conservative efforts to divide the working class along racial
lines; a thesis that she extends to the rise of racial segregation, or Jim
Crow. Why Alexander focuses almost exclusively on conservative efforts
to “bribe” poor whites deserves some comment, if for no other reason than
to place her theory within a broader, intellectual context.180 Mildly
reminiscent of Marxian “false consciousness,” Alexander’s notion of a
false working class “consensus” coincides with a long tradition of
American historiography placing “class and economic divisions” at the
center of politics.181 To such historians, including C. Vann Woodward,
race remains primarily an “instrumental” device employed by elites to
manipulate the poor.182 As historian John Cell puts it, “[r]acism is indeed
what Lenin called false consciousness.”183
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Yet, recent historians have begun to move away from Leninist
takes on the origins of Jim Crow, suggesting that segregation and
disfranchisement stemmed not simply from elite efforts to divide the poor,
but more complex interactions between middle and upper class
southerners, including progressive efforts to advance black interests. As
Section I of this article sought to demonstrate, many of the early
supporters of racial segregation, or Jim Crow, were progressives,
individuals who argued that separating the races promised to reduce racial
violence and help African Americans establish their own institutions and
traditions free from white interference and control. 184
That Jim Crow proved an evil system is worth underscoring,
precisely because it demonstrates the manner in which aspirational politics
can yield unanticipated, negative effects. Section II provides another
example of this, noting how liberal reforms in criminal procedure also
contributed to mass incarceration. Not long after the Supreme Court’s
liberal ruling in Mapp v. Ohio, for example, reports began to emerge that
the decision had actually wreaked unanticipated negative effects on the
streets, prompting police to develop intrusive, violent methods of evidence
gathering.185 As moderates sought to curb police procedure, they
advanced a structured model of “stop and frisk” aimed at curbing police
abuses. 186 However, this model proved to have its own perverse effects,
greatly facilitating the extent to which police could peacefully stop and
apprehend black suspects on the street.187 As Alexander herself notes, the
rise of stop and frisk provided the first vital “step” in the larger process of
achieving “racially discriminatory results” in American criminal justice. 188
The ultimate manifestation of racial discrimination in criminal
justice, concludes Alexander, is the War on Drugs, a campaign that she
attributes to conservative wedge politics aimed at dividing America’s
working class. Yet, as Section III of this Article illustrates, liberal
aspirations contributed to the war as well. Not only did well-known
democrats like Joe Biden and Gary Hart endorse harsher drug sentences
out of an interest in helping rid black communities of drugs, but
Democrats worked closely with Republicans on developing new
punishment schemes, including sentencing guidelines aimed at reducing
judicial corruption, albeit with devastating results. 189
Finally, current liberal enthusiasm for federal gun regulations, a
sympathetic project in the wake of tragedies like Sandy Hook, also bears
examination as a potential contributor to black incarceration. As recent
ATF stings across the Midwest reveal, federal gun laws tend to target the
184
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very same minorities netted in drug prosecutions, even eliciting
complaints of predatory policing and entrapment.
Throughout, the history of race and policy in America points not
simply to the persistence of prejudice, but the unanticipated pitfalls of
reform. Alexander’s reluctance to acknowledge this uncomfortable truth
weakens her otherwise compelling analogy between mass incarceration
and Jim Crow, pressing her into embracing an overly simplistic historical
narrative of how systems of oppression evolve. For example, Alexander
concludes her case by underscoring the importance of enlisting
“compassion” in the hearts of white voters sufficient to counter the
“indifference” that has marked white attitudes towards blacks since the
1890s.190 Yet, indifference and lack of compassion are arguably not the
root causes of racial inequality in America, as this Article has sought to
demonstrate.
Though generally associated with repression and
discrimination, both Jim Crow and mass incarceration owe their existence
in part to enlightened reforms aimed at promoting black interests, albeit
with perverse results. Recognizing the aspirational origins of systematic
discrimination marks an important facet of comprehending the persistence
of racial inequality in the United States.191
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